There is few papers that analyse South East Asian firm board size and this paper adds to this literature; focusing on the larger listed firms in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. While it is apparent that large firms have large boards there is also more subtle cross-country variation concerning the impact of leverage and profitability on board size. Finally, there is evidence of decreases in average board size for firms in Hong Kong and Singapore over the sample period, 1999 to 2002, with increases in average board size evident for Indonesian and Malaysian firms over the same period.
Introduction
The choice of the most appropriate number of directors for a firm's board of directors is a difficult decision. Yet, there is little investigation into the determinants of board size (Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2003) , particularly for South East Asian nations.
Further, it has been argued that weak governance contributed to the depth of the Asian crisis (Clarke, 2000; Du & Dai, 2005) . This paper provides some insight into post 1997 Asian crisis board size decision made by large firms listed on the stock exchanges of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand over the period from 1999 to 2002.
It is common to read in the popular press about the benefits of smaller boards (Yermack, 1996) . Smaller boards are said to encourage discussion of important issues rather than compliance with CEO recommendations. It has also been suggested that directors on smaller boards are less risk averse and that they react more quickly to changing market conditions (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) . Indeed, Lipton and Lorsch recommended an optimal board size of 8 to 9 directors with a maximum of 10 directors. Yet, there are arguments to suggest that board size choice is endogenous to the firm (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003) and recent economic modelling shows that the level of equity agency costs and information asymmetry specific to a firm may explain variation in board size across firms (Harris & Raviv, 2005; Raheja, 2005) .
Further, while research suggests that one board size need not fit all firms, much of the research dealing with this issue focuses on USA or the UK firms, with little research specifically addressing the Asian firm board size question.
As the focus of this paper is the board of directors, separate director lists are constructed where feasible for each of the firms for each of the years 1999 to 2002.
Accounting data and other firm specific data is also collected for control purposes.
Both the accounting data and the director lists are obtained from OSIRIS, supplied by Bureau van Dijk. 1 This database provides information on a range of listed firms around the world and is available in both electronic form for selected accounting numbers and pdf form for copies of the underlying annual reports.
Because board size is essentially a count of the number of directors on the board, ordered logit is used in all multivariate analysis and the results of analysis show that larger firms have larger boards, leverage is also a determinant of board size in some of the countries and industry effect account for a considerable amount of the variation in board size. There is some evidence of time trends in board size across the sample with board size increasing in some countries and decreasing in other countries over the study period. A review of the literature follows in Section 2 and data is described in Section 3. The results of analysis are reported in section 4 and a summary and conclusions are reported Section 5.
Literature Review
While there is considerable empirical literature describing corporate boards and proposing possible explanations for what is observed (Yermack, 1996) analytical modelling has been less prominent in the analysis of board size. Recent analytical modelling draws upon the equity agency and information asymmetry theories of corporate finance (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers & Majluf, 1984) and provides considerable insights into the board size decision (Harris et al., 2005; Raheja, 2005) . Further, there has also been some empirical support for the predictions of these models (Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2004; Lehn et al., 2003) .
While the Harris and Raviv (1991) Harris and Raviv (2005) . In their model, board size and board composition are jointly determined by verification costs for outsiders (information asymmetry costs) and the private benefits that arise from the implementation of inferior projects for insiders (equity agency costs). Where closer monitoring is required due to greater levels of potential agency conflicts, the optimal level of outsiders on the board tends to increase. One result, highlighted in this literature, occurs where information asymmetry is so severe that the owners of the firm find it optimal to pass control of the firm to management. Essentially the costs of poorly informed owners running the firm exceed the equity agency costs associated with management control of the firm.
It seems clear that reducing the size of the board will not necessarily improve firm performance. Indeed, firms with substantial equity agency costs and little information asymmetry may optimally select large boards to ensure adequate monitoring of management while severe information asymmetry could result in small manager controlled boards. Recent empirical tests of these models, based on USA firms, identify a positive relation between equity agency cost proxies and the size of the board of directors and a negative relation between information asymmetry proxies and the size of the board of directors (Boone et al., 2004; Lehn et al., 2003) .
Neither of these models deals with the situation where the owner also controls the firm. In this case, equity agency costs and information asymmetry costs are low, because the owner of the firm actually manages the firm. Because there is no monitoring role for the board, the optimal board size is expected to be considerably smaller for shareholder-managed firms, relative to firms with clear separation of ownership and control. While it may be difficult to ascertain why the owner of a firm might choose to also manage the firm, this situation is relatively common with South East Asian firms (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000) . Further, tightly controlled ownership of listed firms (one to three controlling shareholders) is evident throughout world financial markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998).
There has been some research into issues important to South East Asian firm governance (Abdullah, 2004; Brewer, 1997; Clarke, 2000; Ong, 2003; Ow-Yong 2000) though there is little reference to the determinants of board size in this literature. One exception is the analysis of Singapore boards (Mak & Chng, 2000; Mak & Yuan, 2001 ) based on data drawn from the period, 1991 to 1995. It is found that board size is negatively correlated with the proportion of outsiders on the board in this analysis. While this result is at odds with more recent analysis (Boone et al., 2004; Lehn et al., 2003) 
Data
Board size and other firm specific data are collected for the largest 150 or so Table 1 for each of the countries and for the years 1999 through 2002. There are some trends evident in the data with increasing average board size over the four-year period for Indonesia and Malaysia and decreasing average board size for Hong Kong, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand over the same period. The standard deviation in board size varies from around 2 board members for Singapore to around 4 board members for Thailand. Board size ranges from 1 through 26 individual directors in a board across the six countries.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The variables used to capture equity agency cost and information asymmetry are limited by data availability, particularly for Thailand and Indonesia, though it is feasible to select a set of variables with reasonable coverage of the firms within each of the countries. The empirical literature identifies firm size as a proxy for equity agency costs (Lehn et al., 2003) though this could also proxy for complexity or access to resources (Boone et al., 2004; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2004) . Regardless, a positive relation is predicted between board size and firm size. While market value based information is limited for many of the firms in the sample, total assets is available on OSIRIS for virtually all of the firms and so the natural log of total assets is chosen as a proxy for size to capture the impact of equity agency costs, complexity or resource access.
The level of equity agency conflicts is also related to shareholder concentration. The more concentrated the shareholding, the lower the equity agency conflicts because as an individual shareholder's stake in the firm increases, eventually the shareholder reaches a stage where they both control and manage the firm. Of Another proxy for information asymmetry is the return on total assets . Value firms tend to generate greater levels of cash flow and earnings than growth firms. Further, value firms tend to exhibit lower levels of information asymmetry than growth firms. Thus, measures of profitability may also proxy for the level of information asymmetry that exists within the firm. In this case it is assumed that the greater the profitability the lower the level of growth options and thus the larger the board, all else constant.
Banking and creditor relationships are recognised as being important (Coles et al., 2004) , particularly in the management of South East Asian firms Clarke, 2000) and so a leverage variable is also included in analysis.
Where creditor or banker exposures are particularly large it is possible that boards will include representation from these parties and so board size may tend to be larger the greater the level of debt or creditors. The leverage measure is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets . A positive relation is predicted between The results from univariate tests for differences in board size are reported across small and large firms, high and low leverage firms and high and low return on asset firms in the last six columns of Table 1 . These tests are conducted by first ranking the firms by the variable of interest, splitting the sample in half and then conducting a t-test for difference in board size between the large and the small, high leverage and low leverage and between high and low return on total assets. The size (LTA) t-test results provide support for the predicted positive relation between firm size and board size, particularly for Hong Kong, Indonesia and Singapore. There is also some evidence of a size effect in the later half of the study period for Malaysia.
Neither the Philippines nor Thailand provide much statistical support for a firm size effects though in virtually all cases the average board size for small firms is less than the average board size for larger firms. There is very little evidence of statistically significant leverage or return on total asset effects other than for Singaporean boards.
These t-tests ignore considerable variation in the data and so multivariate analysis is conducted in the following section.
Analysis
Given the nature of the board size variable, ordered logit is used in the following analysis. While the director counts are naturally ordered, the responses are not continuous in nature and so ordinary least squares regression is not the most appropriate method for analysis of this data. 5 We draw on the ordered response model (Greene, 2003) for a maximum of n directors on the board) using maximum likelihood (Greene, 2003) . Greene notes that interpretation of these models can be quite complex and so we focus our analysis on the underlying latent variable model (Berman & Fry, 2001) 
Cross-sectional analysis
The results from ordered logit analysis for the individual countries are reported in Table 2 . It should be noted that there were not enough firms with complete data sets in the Thailand data set for separate analysis for the years, 1999 and 2000.
Further, industry parameters, while estimated as part of the model, are not reported separately due to the variation across the sample both in terms of parameter sign and significance.
The main result reported for the year-by-year cross-sectional analysis for each of the countries is the consistency in the positive relation observed between firm size and board size (See Table 2 ). Larger South East Asian firms have larger boards. This is consistent with the USA results (Boone et al., 2004; Lehn et al., 2003) . The estimated parameter for the return on total assets is generally positive and often statistically significant for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.
Thus, for these countries, more profitable firms tend to have larger boards. Profitable firms tend to be value firms, rather than growth firms, with low levels of information asymmetry. Thus for value firms it is expected that directors are better able to monitor management and so, given this greater monitoring ability, more profitable firms will optimally select larger boards to facilitate management monitoring (Harris et al., 2005; Raheja, 2005) Leverage parameters are often statistically significant, particularly for 
Pooled analysis
The pooled ordered logit country analysis appears in Table 3 . The positive relation between firm size and board size is now statistically significant at the 5% level for each of the countries. The board independence results are also clearer with a negative relation between board size and shareholder control in Hong Kong and Thailand where one shareholder controls more than 25% of the shares in the firm.
While this is also true for shareholders in Singapore firms, with shareholders having more than a 50% stake in the firm, is not apparent for shareholders with a 25% to 50% stake in the firm. Both Indonesia and the Philippines tend to have larger boards the more concentrated the shareholding in the firm and this effect is statistically significant. With more concentrated ownership it is expected that the owners of the firm would prefer smaller boards yet in Indonesia and the Philippines the reverse relationship is observed over the period from 1999 to 2002. Perhaps there is a further element required for board size modelling in emerging markets, particularly during periods of severe economic and political unrest. It is possible that these boards are larger because the dominant shareholder group uses board positions to foster political and business connections in economies where markets are not functioning effectively or perhaps have failed completely.
[Insert Table 3 about (Table 1 ) and the multivariate analysis (Table 3) .
Thus, while there is a general trend towards smaller boards in the sample over the study period, Indonesia is an important exception. There is also variation in the board size across the various industry groupings within each country though there is little consistent pattern in the incidence of statistically significant difference in board size between the manufacturing sector and other sectors. One exception is the Philippines where there is no statistically significant difference between the board size in the manufacturing industry and other industries represented in the sample.
Conclusions
The average board for all the firms included in the sample consists of nine directors and there is considerable variation in board size across the countries included in the sample. There is also some variation in the average board size of South East Asian firms over the period from 1999 to 2002 with an increase in board size for Indonesia and a decrease for the Philippines and Singapore.
Thus there is some evidence to support the prediction that larger firms have larger boards. Further, firms tend to have larger boards where they earn higher returns on assets. Yet, the impact of concentrated shareholding and leverage varies across the countries in the sample. For example, Indonesian Boards of Commissioners tend to be larger where the firm is large, shareholding is concentrated and return on assets is high. Further, the boards of directors in Singaporean firms tend to be smaller where the dominant shareholder holds over 50% of the shares in the company, where no shareholders own 25% to 50% of the shares and where leverage is high. While not reported separately board size also varies across industry groupings for each of the countries except for the Philippines.
Table 1, Board size descriptive statistics
Board size consists of a count of the number of individual directors that occupy a position on the board at the end of the calendar year. Directors that hold more than one position are counted only once. The company secretary is only included in the count if they are also a director. The statistics are grouped by country and year. NOBS is the number of firms (country and year). Mean is the average board size for the classification. Std. dev. is the standard deviation in board size. Min is the minimum number of directors in a firm. Max. is the maximum number of directors in a firm. Three t-tests are conducted for difference in board size across size (LTA), leverage (LEV) and profitability (ROTA). The sample is sorted by the variable of interest and the average board size for the firms in the upper 50% are compared with the board size of firms in the lower 50% of the sample. The difference between in board size between the top 50% firms and the bottom 50% firms for the variable as well as the probability associated with this test is reported for each of the three variables, t-test prob (LTA), t-test prob (LEV) and t-test prob (ROTA). * (+) statistically significant at the 5%(10%) level of significance 
NOBS

